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ABSTRACT In bioethics, two sorts of normative categories are commonly used. These can be split into two families: the deontic categories, such as ‘right’, ‘ought to’ and ‘requirement’, and the evaluative categories, including ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘better than’ and ‘the best’. While other normative concepts such as ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’ have also been discussed, the aptic categories, including ‘fitting’, ‘appropriate’ and ‘merited’ have received little to no attention from bioethicists. Drawing on Philip Stratton‐Lake's important contributions to the metaethical literature on the aptic categories, this paper investigates the role of fittingness in bioethics. To this end, we first establish four characteristic features of the aptic categories. We then show how fittingness can be applied in four areas of bioethical research, before considering some objections. We conclude that there is much to be gained by expanding the dialogue between recent metaethical work on the aptic categories and practical ethics.

More information Original publication

DOI

10.1111/rati.70023

Type

Journal article

Publisher

Wiley

Publication Date

2026-05-04T00:00:00+00:00